by Neil Colville-ReevesWhat’s Reasonable?
What’s Reasonable?
That is of course a subjective question and one that you won’t find an explicit answer for in the case of Konopka v. Traders. However, you will read about what is not considered to be reasonable conduct in the context of an OAP 1 policy breach. In Konopka, the elderly insured fell ill while driving to her cottage and permitted her unlicensed husband to drive her vehicle to a nearby parking lot where they intended to stop and rest until she felt better. Shortly after taking the wheel, the unlicensed husband caused an accident. There was no dispute that the insured was aware that her husband was unlicensed and as a result on the face of it she was in breach of the ‘authorized by law to drive’ provision in section 4(1) of the policy. The insurer denied coverage as a result.
The court noted that a breach of this nature was subject to a strict liability standard which required that the insured to establish that she took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular event. The reasonableness standard requires a consideration of the nature of the breach, what caused it and all of the surrounding circumstances that explain the act or omission. The court ultimately determined that it was not reasonable for the insured to allow her husband to drive. It is worth noting that the court relied in large part on the discovery transcript of the husband which betrayed a level of confusion and an inability to focus. The court ultimately concluded that the husband was someone ‘who simply cannot get his bearings’ and as a result it was not reasonable to allow him to drive, regardless of the circumstances.
This case is fact driven but provides a good counterpoint to the decision of Ontario’s Court of Appeal in Kozel v. Personal. In that case, the insured was also in breach of section 4(1) for driving while she was not authorized by law to drive. However, in that case the license suspension was the result of a failure to respond to a license renewal notice which was considered to be a ‘relatively minor breach’. In contrast, allowing an elderly individual who had an ‘inability to get his bearings’ and who had not driven in more than 20 years was something quite different and ultimately, not reasonable. https://bit.ly/2KoWLxQ
by Neil Colville-ReevesThe Tale of Red’s Pub – Risk Allocation in Commercial Leases
In Youn v 1427062 Alberta Ltd. , the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench considered risk shifting in the context of a commercial lease.
In this subrogated matter, the appellant landlord owned a commercial property that included the respondent’s pub, Red’s Pub, and neighbouring businesses. A fire broke out in Red’s Pub and the pub was destroyed. The fire caused damage to a neighbouring businesses. The landlord’s insurer commenced a subrogated action against Red’s Pub for the damage.
Red’s Pub successfully brought an application to dismiss the claim. The Master concluded that the landlord was barred from advancing any action against Red’s Pub as the lease, when read as a whole, transferred the risk of loss by fire to the landlord. The landlord appealed the decision of the Master.
On appeal, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench reviewed several clauses in the lease and found that the landlord assumed the risk of loss by fire. The lease specified that Red’s Pub was responsible for any increase in the cost of fire insurance caused by its conduct. The court held that this term implied that the landlord intended to carry fire insurance. In addition, the lease required the premises to be kept in good repair, except when there was damage from fire. The lease specifically required that Red’s Pub carry insurance against burglary, glass insurance, public liability, and property damage. There was no specific reference to fire insurance. Finally, it was provided in the lease that if Red’s Pub could not be repaired within 120 days of fire damage, then the lease would terminate.
After reading all of the sections of the lease together, the court held the landlord impliedly agreed to obtain fire insurance for the benefit of Red’s Pub. As a result, the appeal was dismissed.
This decision underscores the importance of completing a detailed review of all leasing documentation in advance of pursuing a subrogated action.
by Neil Colville-ReevesMunicipal Matrix: Distinguishing Policy from Operational Decisions
In Binette v. Salmon Arm, the B.C. Court of Appeal had an opportunity to analyze the difference between policy and operational decision making in the context of a municipal liability claim. In Binette, the plaintiff tripped on the base of a broken traffic sign. The City had previously discovered a detached crosswalk sign in a nearby yard and failed to locate the base of the sign. The failure was initially as a result of snow cover and eventually due to the City no longer looking.
Although the City’s sign replacement policy did not require the sign to be replaced immediately the City acknowledged that its standard practice was to use its best efforts to locate and remediate immediate hazards. In this instance, the City inspector had ‘walked the general area and shoveled some areas’ looking for the broken base but being unable to locate the base he stored the broken sign until the snow melted. This was found not to be ‘best efforts’ given that he knew that the base of the sign was an immediate hazard.
This case presents the classic formulation of the test for municipal liability. Governmental authorities are immunized from liability where a loss stems from policy decisions made in good faith. Resources are finite and municipalities must be able to make decisions regarding allocation of resources without being second guessed. To the contrary they are not immunized when a loss arises from the implementation of the policy decision at an operational level. If you are prosecuting or defending municipal claims (whether it is a slip and fall, infrastructure, construction or inspection failure) it is critical to understand the difference between a policy decision (to identify and remedy an immediate hazard) and the implementation of that policy at an operational level (not continuing to look for the immediate hazard until it was found). It is often a nuanced distinction.
by Neil Colville-ReevesIt’s All About Storage
Issues relating to storage fees and insurers rights under the Repair and Storage Liens Act were the subject of a recent Court of Appeal decision.
In 2237466 Ontario v. Intact , the insured and insurer agreed that the insured’s vehicle which was damaged in an incident would be cashed out on an ACV basis. The car had been stored and there was a dispute about the amount owing by Intact for the storage. Intact obtained a s. 24 certificate under the RSLA which required the release the vehicle. 2237466 Ontario brought an application to have the certificate declared null and void because Intact had not paid the insured and was not the ‘owner or other person lawfully entitled to the vehicle’, a precondition for the party obtaining the section 24 certificate. The court found that because Intact had assumed liability for the vehicle by agreeing to pay out on an ACV basis they were subrogated to the rights of the insured.
The Court of Appeal noted that the position advanced by 2237466 Ontario would defeat the purpose of the RSLA which provides an expeditious way to address disputes dealing with storage costs. Although the amount in issue was likely modest (the case does not address quantum) the implications of an adverse decision could have been significant to insurers.
Read the decision here: 2237466 Ontario v. Intact
by Neil Colville-ReevesDisclosing Litigation Agreements
The Court of Appeal issued reasons on March 29, 2018 detailing the obligations of parties when entering into litigation agreements. The decision in Handley Estate v. DTE Industries is both a reminder and cautionary tale that provides a nice roadmap of things to do and not to do when entering into these kinds of agreements as part of a litigation strategy. The decision is a must read for those involved in litigation where Pierringer, Mary Carter or other litigation agreements are employed.
In Handley, the plaintiff was a subrogating insurer in an oil spill claim. They failed to name one of the oil tank vendors in the supply chain. Because the limitation period had passed by the time it became apparent that the vendor was a necessary party, the plaintiff entered into a funding agreement with one of three defendants which required that defendant to issue a third party claim against the ‘missed’ vendor. In return the plaintiff would fund a finite portion of the cost of the third party action. The agreement was not disclosed to the other defendants. The plaintiff and the same defendant entered into a second agreement several years later which effectively saw the subrogating insurer step into the shoes of that defendant by way of an assignment of that defendant’s rights in the third party action. The existence of the second agreement was subsequently disclosed but not immediately. The plaintiff was eventually compelled to disclose the fact and details of the first agreement as well.
One of the other defendants who was not a party to the agreement brought a motion to stay the action on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to disclose the initial agreement and failed to disclose the subsequent agreement in a timely manner. The Court Of Appeal agreed, noting that agreements which ‘change entirely the landscape of the litigation’ must be disclosed immediately and that a failure to do so amounts to an abuse of process. There are sound policy reasons for this rule. The rules of our litigation process do not provide for trial by ambush or other ‘gotcha’ litigation strategies but rather embrace transparency and full disclosure. Procedural fairness requires that parties adhere to those principles. As the court noted, any agreement that has the effect of ‘changing the adversarial position of the parties set out in their pleadings into a cooperative one’ must be disclosed immediately to the other parties.
If there is any doubt about which side of the line to fall on when faced with disclosing litigation agreements the outcome in this case (which to some might appear Draconian) should make that decision an easy one.
Handley Estate v. DTE Industries
by Neil Colville-ReevesImproperly Accessing Confidential Data Under the Direction of Employer?
What do you do at work that is considered ‘under the direction’ of your employer?
The answers to this question are endless. A more interesting question: what do you have to be doing at work not to be ‘acting under the direction’ of your employer? That question is at the heart of the decision in Oliveira v. Aviva , a Court of Appeal decision released this week. The applicant sought coverage and a defence for claims brought against her by a hospital patient for damages as a result of applicant’s alleged accessing the hospital records of a patient who was not under her care. The crux of the case turned on whether the applicant (defendant in the lawsuit) was an insured under the policy issued by Aviva. The policy would provide coverage if the allegations in the underlying Statement of Claim alleged conduct took place while the applicant was acting under the direction of the named insured but only with respect to liability arising from the operations of the named insured.
Because the policy provided coverage for ‘invasion or violation of privacy’, also referred to as the tort of intrusion upon seclusion (which would include accessing records in an unauthorized manner) the court held that the policy was by definition intended to cover offensive conduct that would presumably not be authorized by the insurer. In that case, how can coverage be denied for conduct that on the face of it would appear to be covered?
Acting under the direction of the employer relates not to control how the work is done or actual oversight at the moment of the incident (in this case when records were improperly accessed) but rather flows from the relationship generally and ‘control’ over incidental features of the of the employment such as directing when and where to work and having the right to terminate the employment.
Whether the alleged misconduct arose out of the operations of the named insured was also in issue. The insurer argued that hospitals operations are to provide care and because the employee was not within the patient’s circle of care, her conduct did not fall within the operations of the hospital. The court rejected this argument, noting that the ‘operations’ of the hospital included creating, collecting and maintaining medical records. The underlying claim against the applicant (defendant) for which coverage was sought related to allegations about the unauthorized access to those medical records.
Ultimately however, in reading the decision, the irresistible inference is that the court accepted that because the policy covered ‘intrusion upon seclusion’, it could only be read to cover the alleged misconduct. As a result to deny coverage for the very conduct that the policy was intended to cover would be perverse. It is also consistent with the underlying interpretive imperative of insurance policies – coverage should be interpreted broadly and exclusions should be interpreted narrowly.
by Neil Colville-ReevesReconciling Inconsistent Policy Documents through Rectification
Reconciling Inconsistent Policy Documents through Rectification
The recent Court of Appeal decision in Alguire v. Manulife provides a helpful primer (and reminder) on the law of rectification, an equitable remedy not often invoked in insurance related litigation. This case involved a GRIP life insurance policy issued by Manulife to the plaintiff in 1982. The face amount of the coverage was $5,000,000. The policy required large premiums payable up front and reduced premiums payable over time and included a guaranteed paid up value that would ensure a pre-determined coverage amount that was guaranteed even in the event of a default by the insured in paying premiums. The guaranteed amount was memorialized in a table of non-forfeiture values that would increase over time. The approved quote for the policy agreed to by the parties included the non-forfeiture table that was based on each $5,000 of the face amount of the coverage. However when the policy was issued the non-forfeiture table was presented based on each $1,000 of the face amount of the coverage. The result was that the paid up value was always 5 times greater than what it was supposed to be and eventually exceeded the face value of the policy by a factor of almost 3. At the time of trial, despite a policy with a face value of $5,000,000 the paid up value which was guaranteed was $13,400,000 instead of $2,680,000. The plaintiff sought a ruling that affirmed the higher paid up value.
The plaintiff attempted to justify his position by testifying that he had specifically requested a policy that would provide ‘inflation protection’. He testified that he reviewed the non-forfeiture table with the (now deceased) broker who expressly represented to him that the non-forfeiture value would eventually exceed the face value of the policy.
At trial, the court held that the parties contracted for a policy with a maximum value of $5,000,000 and the inclusion of the non-forfeiture table that showed a higher amount was clearly an error. As a result the court exercised its discretion to rectify the contract so that is accurately reflected the agreement reached between the parties. The Court of Appeal agreed noting that in order to rectify the contract Manulife was required to lead evidence to establish that the parties had reached a ‘prior agreement whose terms are definite and ascertainable’.
The court was satisfied that it had done so. The court ultimately considered the notion that a policy with non-forfeiture values that exceeded the face value of the policy to be nonsensical. In addition the non-forfeiture tables had no inflation related pattern which undermined the plaintiff’s position that he had bargained for inflation protection.
by Neil Colville-ReevesLAT Holds Attendant Care is not Payable before the Submission of a Form 1
At issue in Applicant and Aviva (2018 Can LII 13190) was whether attendant care was payable for the period of time before the Claimant submitted a Form 1.
The Claimant was injured in a July 1, 2014 accident and sought attendant care expenses in the amount of $1,424.24 per month for the period July 14, 2014 to March 30, 2015. The Claimant Form 1 was not provided to the insurer until October 31, 2014. The Insurer agreed to fund the attendant care for the period after the Form 1 was submitted, but refused to fund the attendant care for the time period before the Form 1 was submitted. Aviva submitted that entitlement arose when it received the Form 1.
The Adjudicator found in favour of Aviva and determined entitlement arose the date the Form 1 was received on the basis of Section 42(5) of the SABS. The Adjudicator noted that the Claimant had opted to provide no submissions refuting Aviva’s position and did not provide any evidence indicating the Form 1 was received earlier. He indicated that incurring attendant care treatment does not automatically entitle an Insured to attendant care benefits. Pursuant to section 19 of the SABS, it is the reasonableness and necessity for attendant care services which entitle an insured to the benefit.
by Neil Colville-ReevesCourt of Appeal finds $225,000 General Damages Award to be Reasonable
[et_pb_section bb_built=”1″][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.9″]In Dunk v. Kremer, the 18 year old Plaintiff (Respondent at Appeal) was injured in a motor vehicle accident and suffered a tibia fracture and right talus bone fracture requiring surgery. At trial, the jury awarded damages for future loss of income and cost of medical care, as well as $225,000.00 in general damages. The Defendant (Appellant at Appeal) appealed, among other things, the amount of the general damages award.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Appeal, noting that the matter was in the trial judge’s discretion and the general damages award was not so inordinately high as to call for appellant intervention. The Court noted the Plaintiff’s young age at the time of the accident, the years of pain she had suffered, the impact of the accident on her day-to-day activities and future plans, as well as that her accident-related injuries were going to cause her significant and serious long-term pain and impairment.
This case also addresses expert reports under Rule 53. Briefly, the Defendant did not indicate they would be calling their expert and provided an unsigned copy of the expert’s report. After hearing the evidence of the Plaintiff’s expert, the Defendant moved for an order permitting it to call their expert. The trial judge ruled that the expert could be called, but that he would be restricted to the four corners of his report and would not be permitted to comment on developments that had arisen after he had prepared his report. This prevented the Defendant expert from commenting on the likelihood that the Plaintiff would develop arthritis in the future that would leave her “quite disabled”. The Defendant appealed on the basis that the ruling prevented their expert from commenting on the oral evidence of the Plaintiff’s expert. Ultimately, the Court dismissed this aspect of the appeal and highlighted that the situation was largely the fault of the Defendant.
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by Neil Colville-ReevesWhat’s In a Name?
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Plenty. Particularly if you are an insurer attempting to advance a subrogated claim and your insured is in bankruptcy protection proceedings. This was the circumstance faced by the insurer in Douglas v. Ferguson Fuels . What would have otherwise been a garden variety oil spill subrogated action was complicated by ongoing bankruptcy proceedings involving the insureds. By the time the subrogated claim was issued the insured had made an assignment in bankruptcy. By application of s. 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the insured’s right of action vested in the trustee once an assignment in bankruptcy was made. The subrogated action was commenced in the name of the insured and the court, applying long standing principles of bankruptcy law held that the claim commenced in the name of the insured was a nullity. Had the claim been brought in the name of the Trustee the insurer would have been entitled to proceed.
There were a number of technical issues argued in relation to the law of misnomer (where the court will substitute the correct party for a party improperly identified) and the distinction between the law of subrogation and assignment. Ultimately the court determined that the naming of the insured personally instead of the Trustee could not properly be characterized as a misnomer. The action was ultimately dismissed. Two of the five judge panel dissented on the basis that the insurer should have the opportunity to argue the misnomer issue before the Superior Court motions judge.
The take away: be mindful of the technical consequences of an assignment in bankruptcy as it pertains to advancing subrogated actions. Although the issue more often arises where a target defendant is in a bankruptcy proceeding (which requires that steps be taken by the subrogating insurer in order to proceed) this case demonstrates that advancing a claim on behalf of a bankrupt insured can be a minefield that requires planning and thoughtful advocacy.
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